Cloud Security meets Telemedicine by Johnstone, Michael N
Edith Cowan University 
Research Online 
ECU Publications Post 2013 
2014 
Cloud Security meets Telemedicine 
Michael N. Johnstone 
Edith Cowan University, m.johnstone@ecu.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworkspost2013 
 Part of the Information Security Commons 
Johnstone, M. N. (2014). Cloud Security meets Telemedicine. electronic Journal of Health Informatics, 8(2), 14. 
Available here 
This Journal Article is posted at Research Online. 
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworkspost2013/2598 
electronic Journal of Health Informatics
www.eJHI.net
2014; Vol 8(2):e14
Cloud Security meets Telemedicine
Michael N Johnstone
Edith Cowan University Security Research Institute, Perth, Australia
Abstract
Medical systems are potentially one domain where security is seen as an impediment to patient
care and not as an essential part of a system. This is an issue for safety-critical systems where
reliability and trust areessential for successful operation. Cloud computing servicesoffer aseamless
means to allow medical data to be transferred from patient to medical specialist, whilst maintaining
security requirements. This paper uses a case study to investigate the use of cloud computing in
a mobile application to assist with diagnostics for patients with Parkinson Disease. It was found
that the developers of the app ignored security requirements and standards, preferring to focus on
functionality.
Keywords: Information Systems Security; Cloud Computing; Telemedicine; Applications Develop-
ment
1 Introduction
Confidentiality, Integrity andAvailability areconsidered
to be thecorebuilding blocksof information security.
It would beexpected, therefore, that softwaresystems
would be developed as amatter of course with these
building blocks in mind as software is ubiquitous (cf.
the Internet of S¸thingsTˇ). This isespecially important
in safety-critical domainssuch asmedical systems. Un-
fortunately most software, according to [1], is insecure.
Johnstone [2] notes that this is due to the tension be-
tween functional requirements (which are visible to
customers-those who commission and fund systems)
and security requirements (which often arenot visible).
A somewhat darker view is held by [3], who suggest
that security requirements are often omitted from re-
quirementsspecificationsaltogether.
Medical systems appear especially problematic as,
given that their primary focus is patient care, security
iseither assumed or ignored [4]. Several well-reported
cases, such asStanford HospitalŠs loss of 20,000 ER
patient records [5] and an Australian pathology labo-
ratoryŠs lossof patient data ([6], highlight theembar-
rassment and loss of trust that occurs when medical
data is leaked (abreach of confidentiality). Clearly the
natureof thedataand its intended usemust determine
which of thecore tenetsof information security would
beapplicable. For a real-timeheart-ratemonitor in an
operating theatre, both Integrity and Availability would
be critical, Confidentiality less so. In an on-lineweb-
based patient record input system, Confidentiality and
Integrity would be dominant, with Availability being
perhapsnot as important.
According to a recent IBIS report [7] health and al-
lied systemsare S¸poised to becomeAustraliaŠsbiggest
industry division and employer well before 2050...In
thisdivision, superfast broadbandwill bevital in driving
healthcarecostsdown by faster diagnostics, preventive
health systems [and] partial self-diagnostic services...Tˇ
Softwareengineering asadiscipline is still maturing,
so it is not unreasonable that software development
that focusseson security concerns isstill in its infancy.
There is certainly evidenceof an evolution from object-
orientation in the 1980s, component-based software
engineering in the1990s, service-oriented architectures
in the2000s to cloud computing now. Given that cloud
computing in itsmost basic form providesa façade for
datastorageand retrieval, it canprovideseamlessaccess
to data which could make data management simpler
and thus potentially improve information technology
security management, especially as both patients and
medical practitioners make increased use of wireless
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transmission of dataand Internet-based applications.
Thispaper describes the issues involvedwithmedical
systemsand theconcomitant standards that apply to the
development and useof such systems, explains the the-
ory behind cloud computing and how thismay benefit
medical systems, usesacasestudy to illustrate theef-
fectivenessof cloud-based datastorageand retrieval for
medical data, specifically an iPad app which provides
diagnostic tests for patientsand neurologists, and finally
considerssomesecurity weaknessesof cloudcomputing
relevant tomedical systems.
2 Methods
The research question being examined is S¸To what ex-
tent aresecurity concernsaddressed in thedevelopment
of cloud-basedmedical applications?Tˇ. Galliers [8] pro-
videsauseful taxonomy whichenablesthecorrect selec-
tion of a researchmethod (or approach, to useGalliers
term). According to Table 1, the object of interest is
methodology as the focus ison how system developers
prioritise and implement security requirements in the
domain of medical systems.
On thespectrum of modes, thosebased on interpre-
tivism were rejected on the basis that the researcher
was not directly involved in the development (except
to provide guidance when requested). This immedi-
ately discountedmodessuch asaction research, which
require the researcher to beactively immersed in the re-
search. Thereforeseveral observational researchmodes
present ascandidates, viz: field experiment, casestudy
and survey. Given that field experiments requirecontrol
of a limited set of variables and that surveys can only
report what is said, not what was actually done, case
study wasdeemed to be themost appropriate research
approach for thiswork.
The researcher was able to gather project artefacts
from thesystem development (which included project
management documents, product documentation and
versionsof theproduct itself). The researcher had full
access to thedevelopment team and theclient and thus
wasable tomakeextensivefield notesof meetings.
3 Results
Before describing the results of the study, it is worth-
whileoutlining relevant medical standardsand present-
ing an overview of cloud computing which will contex-
tualise the results, given that thesystem being studied
isamedical application running on a tablet deviceand
transmitting dataviacloud services.
3.1 Security Standards pertinent to Medical
Systems
Mizukuraet al. [9] proposedahomehealthcarenetwork
based on the IEEE 11073 standard. ISO/IEEE 11073
isactually a family of health informaticsstandards, for
example, 11073-10407 specifies thebehaviour of blood
pressuremonitors. Mizukuraet al. field-tested ahealth
monitoring application that was designed to capture
heath data from elderly patients in their own environ-
ment and transmit suchdataacrossanetwork to relevant
medical practitioners.
Significant progress has been madeon issues to do
with precisely how to transfer medical data. For exam-
ple, ISO/IEEE11073-20601 [10, p1] definesan abstract
model of personal health dataaswell as theappropriate
transport independent transfer grammar required to set
up logical connectionsbetweensystems. Suchstandards
arebeing implemented by manufacturersof telemedical
equipment [11].
ISO 27799 [12] recognises the problem and states
S¸The need for effective IT security management in
healthcare ismadeall themoreurgent by the increasing
useof wirelessand Internet technologies in healthcare
delivery. If not implemented properly, these complex
technologieswill increase therisks to theconfidential-
ity, integrity and availability of health information.Tˇ.
ISO 27799 providesguidanceabout what sort of health
dataneeds to beprotected, but likemany standards, is
descriptive, rather than prescriptive. For example, it
declares that personal health information (such as that
collected by the iPad app described later in this section)
needs to beprotected, but doesnot specify theprecise
meansof protection that would meet thestandard.
HL7 V2 is an OSI level 7 (hence the name) ANSI
standard protocol for communication between health
serviceproviders in Australia. It offerssecurity checks,
participant identification, availability checks, negotiat-
ing exchange mechanism negotiation and provides a
standard datastructure. Whilst HL7messagesare text-
based (and thus perhaps lend themselves to encoding
in XML and transmission via SOAP), theHL7 proto-
col doessupport the transfer of picturedataviaBase64
encoding of the binary data stream. Whilst there is a
clearly defined structureor ontology for HL7messages,
there isno innate formatting or defined dependency be-
tween thedata in theobservation (OBX) segmentsof a
resultsmessage.
HL7 supports the encoding of patient identifiers,
provider identifiers and observations (medical test re-
sults), whilst at the lowest level, recognises message
start and end identifiers as well as individual unique
message identifiers (to ensure that collisionsdo not oc-
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Modes for traditional empir ical approaches (observations) Modes for newer approaches
(interpretations)
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Individual No Yes Yes Possibly Possibly Possibly Yes Yes Yes Possibly
Technology Yes Yes Yes No Possibly Yes Yes Yes Possibly No
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Building
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Theory
Testing
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Exten-
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Table1: A Taxonomy of ISResearch Approaches (adapted from [8] ).
cur) and acknowledgments (although it ismorecorrect
to say that an HL7-compliant application recognises the
message identifiersand processes them accordingly).
Having examined some relevant standardsand proto-
cols for the transmission and storageof medical data, it
isnow appropriate to discusshow thosedatacould be
stored using cloud-based services.
3.2 An Overview of Cloud Computing
Asmentioned previously, cloud computing represents
an evolution in theprovision of softwareservices, rather
than a revolution. However, as with any S¸newTˇ con-
cept, there issometimesconfusion as to what it actually
representsand what benefitsmight accrue from theuse
of such technology. In this section cloud computing
is defined, the architecture of a cloud-based system
explained and variousmodelsof cloud computing are
discussed.
Conventionally, cloud computing appears to be fo-
cussed on large-scalestorageof information acrossmul-
tipleservers. NIST [13, p2] provideasuccinct definition
of cloud computing that encompassesmore than just
distributed storage: S¸Eˇamodel for enabling ubiquitous,
convenient, on-demand network access to ashared pool
of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks,
servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be
rapidly provisioned and released withminimal manage-
ment effort or serviceprovider interactionTˇ.
Badger et al. [14] claim that cloud computing has
essential characteristics that differentiate it from ear-
lier modelsof distributed computing: on-demand self-
service, broad network access, resourcepooling, rapid
elasticity andmeasured service.
Badger et al. also suggest a range of service and
deployment models that providecoverageof thecloud
computing landscape. Theservicemodels includenot
only the familiar softwareasaservice (SaaS), but also
platform asaservice (PaaS) and Infrastructureasaser-
vice(IaaS). PaaSencompassessoftwareplatforms(such
as .NET), databaseenginesand operating systems. IaaS
provides CPUs, virtualisation (if required) and block
storage. An examplearchitecture isshown in figure1.
Clearly, oneof themain advantagesof amulti-layered
architecture is theability to fine-tune resourcepooling
in themiddle layers to effect achange in performance
without theserviceuser beingawareof thechange(apart
from theobserved performanceboost). Whilst resource
pooling is usually abenefit as it provides redundancy,
it will be shown in a later section that there are secu-
rity implicationswith thecomplex architectures that are
3
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Figure1: CloudComputingArchitecture(adapted from[15]).
used to deliver cloud services.
Thedeployment modelsproposedby Badger et al. are
private, community, public and hybrid clouds. Clearly,
aprivatecloud exists for theuseof oneconsumer (busi-
ness) exclusively. The cloud may be used by many
businessunitswithin thesameenterprisebut theservice
provision may, in fact, be outsourced to a third party
(which is likely and therefore the infrastructure isalso
likely to beremote from theconsumer). A community
cloud issimilar except that theconsumer in thiscase is
agroup of interested parties that arenot from thesame
enterprise. Theservicemay bemanaged by oneof the
parties in thecommunity or by a third party. A hybrid
cloud, asthenameimplies, canuseacombinationof any
of the threeaforementioned deployment models. The
models remain distinctivebut are linked by standardsor
proprietary systems that permit dataand/or application
portability.
Having defined cloud computing and discussed var-
ious cloud serviceand deployment models in general,
what follows isacasestudy which usescloud-based ser-
vices to sharemedical databetween interested parties.
3.3 Case Study: An iPad App to assist with the
management of Parkinson Disease
The brief for this system was to provide a proof-of-
concept iPad application (app) that allowed patients
with Parkinson Disease to perform several testswhich
provide diagnostic information and allow the test re-
sults to beshared with aneurologist, hence facilitating
management of thedisease. Themajor benefit is that pa-
tientsneed not travel to see their neurologist to perform
the tests. Given that a largeproportion of patientsare in
the70-79 agegroup [16], theability for thesystem to
link to aneurologist and transfer dataseamlessly wasa
primerequirement. By conforming to AppleŠsHuman
InterfaceGuidelines, it wasexpected that this require-
Figure 2: Sample Test from the Parkinson Disease Tester
App.
ment could be met, provided that the cloud services
could be implemented for an iPad. Figure2 and Figure
3 show somesamplescreen shotsof theapp.
Thebasic requirementsweretoprovideanapp that al-
lowsapatient to perform twodiagnostic tests, allow one
or moreof those tests to besaved and stored locally, to
providesummary statisticsand relevant graphical feed-
back to apatient so that s/hemay track his/her progress
and (critically for thisdiscussion on information secu-
rity) allow the sharing of patient data between one or
more parties (usually the patientŠs neurologist) in a
seamlessand transparent way.
Cloud computing wasdeemed to beapotential solu-
tion to the last requirement. The sharing requirement
had to allow a patient to send a sharemessage to an-
other iPad user, for the second user to respond in the
affirmative (or negative) to allow the transfer of patient
dataand for thefirst user to have theability to rescind
theoriginal sharing request and thusbreak theconnec-
tion. Several cloud providerswere investigated includ-
ing iCloud, Google, NuvolabaseandMoai. iCloud was
an obviousfirst choiceas the target devicewasan iPad,
but thisservice ismeant to beapersonal cloud service
used acrossmany devices. It isnot designed for sharing
fileswithmultipleusers. Theother cloud serviceswere
evaluated, the result being that theMoai cloud, despite
being targeted at thegaming community, met all of the
functional requirements and thus was selected as the
cloud service for thisapplication.
The app works by storing local data using SQLite
(chosen because it doesnot requireadatabaseserver),
the data is stored in the cloud as a JSON (JavaScript
Object Notation) fileand accessed using RESTful ser-
vices (common tomost Web applications). JSON isa
text-based standard (see RFC 4627) for defining and
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Figure3: SampleOutput from theParkinson DiseaseTester
App.
sending structured databetween aWeb application and
aserver. JSON provides theusual data types (number,
string, Boolean, array and object). A JSON structure
for the iPad app test dataobject is:
"test": [
{
"type": "spiral",
"number": "20",
"date": ‘‘20121009",
"value-array", [4,6,5,3,3,7]
},
{
"type": "countdown",
"number": "6"
"date": ‘‘20121009",
"value": ‘‘13"
}
]
In this structure thereare two typesof test and whilst
they sharesomecommon dataelements such asa test
number and a test date, theactual results aredifferent.
JSON is able to characterise thesedifferent structures
easily and thus is a good choice for representing the
ontology of a test.
4 Discussion
Thissection evaluatescloud computing in termsof the
tenetsof information security, addresses issuesspecific
to the case study and concludes by considering some
practical (security) and legal barriers to theacceptance
and useof cloud computing services for medical data.
Considering cloud computing in its simplest (con-
ventional) incarnation that of distributed file storage
and retrieval, there are several aspectsof confidential-
ity, integrity and availability that areworth discussing.
If patient data is stored unencrypted on acloud-based
file system this would appear, at first glance, to be a
breach of confidentiality as the file is stored in plain
text (plain text in this context does not necessarily re-
fer to ASCII text, but to any non-encrypted form of
data, for example human-readable XML records, Mi-
crosoft Word documents or the data referred to in the
casestudy). Confidentiality ismaintainedby twomeans.
First, the user does not know which physical location
stores the data and second, the datamay be split into
several partsacrossseveral locations. Thesemblanceof
asinglefile ismaintained by thecloud façadeaspart of
SaaS(recall figure1). Integrity appearsproblematic by
virtueof thebenefitswhich assureconfidentiality, that
is, the separation of the file into multiple parts across
multiplelocations. Provided that thePaaSlayer is intact,
themarshalling of thefile from itsparts into awhole is
transparent to an end-user of thecloud. Availability is,
of course, handled by the IaaS layer.
Thisdescribes thescenario whereall of thecompo-
nentsof cloud computing work seamlessly to provide
the services expected of them. From a security per-
spective, it isworth examining how standard attackson
confidentiality, integrity and availability might affect
the provision of cloud services. A standard attack on
availability is denial-of-service (DoS). Figure 4 indi-
catesan alarming trend. DoSattacksare increasing, not
in complexity, but in their size. Thismeans that aDoS
attack on acloud serviceprovider will almost certainly
result in a lossof availability. Thewider problem is that
theoutcomeof aDoSattack may affect integrity if afile
ispartially constructed. Theremay be theopportunity
for the data to bemodified or for data to be leaked (a
breach of confidentiality) because of a failure in the
other serviceprovision layers.
Turning now to thespecificsof thecasestudy, awell-
trodden mitigation pathway for problemsof confiden-
tiality isencryption. Certainly thedatabeing transferred
from an iPad to theMoai cloud could beencrypted be-
fore transmission from apatientŠs iPad and storageand
decrypted on retrieval on aneurologistŠs iPad. Whether
apublic key infrastructureor privatekeysarechosen is
perhapsnot an issueas long as thekey length prohibits
thedatabeing compromised during itseffectivelifetime,
notwithstanding the key transmission safety issues in-
herent in thesharing of privatekeys. Integrity issuesare
often dealt with by theuseof cyclic redundancy checks
or hashing. Both techniquesare feasiblewith thedata
being transferred from the iPad to thecloud. It requires
that thePaaS layer becapableof forming and sending a
re-transmission request if datawere found to becorrupt.
Availability issuesappear themost insoluble in this sce-
nario becauseof theeaseby which DoSattackscan be
mounted. It ispossible that IPv6, with itssignificantly
5
Johnstone | electronic Journal of Health Informatics 2014; Vol 8(2):e14
larger addressspace(ascompared to IPv4) may provide
asuccessful mitigation strategy.
Rather than using JSON as the messaging format,
HL7 could provide a better alternative. One possible
mapping of an observation or OBX record (diagnos-
tic test result) equivalent to theaforementioned JSON
representation is:
OBX-2 (Value type) NM
// a number
OBX-3 (Observation ID) 6^Countdown^LN
// the type of test
OBX-5 (numeric) 13
// the actual value
OBX-6 (units) s^Seconds^ISO+
// units of the value
OBX-14 (date/time of observation)
20121009+1000
On itsown, theuseof HL7 over JSON doesnot ap-
pear to providesignificant benefits. In termsof message
transfer between a patient and a neurologist the over-
heads for HL7 aregreater but there are somesecurity
advantages as mentioned in a previous section. Re-
membering that theapp is designed to share data in a
one-to-many relationship, the real benefit to using HL7
is realised when several health careproviderswish to
sharedataabout thesamepatient. In thisscenario, us-
ing acommon protocol designed for health datamakes
the translation and interpretation of thedata relatively
straightforward.
Thebenefit of thecloud in termsof hiding thephys-
ical location/structureof thefilebecomesproblematic
when confidentiality is breached at the lower levels
of the cloud architecture (Figure 1). This is largely
because, especially in a hybrid deployment, multiple
stakeholdersacrossmultipledomainsmay sharephysi-
cal dataspace. In contrast to amoreconventional model
of datastoragewhereastakeholder hasaccess to con-
tiguousspace, in theshared (cloud) space, partsof files
may be juxtaposed with data from other stakeholders.
This leads to questionsabout effectiveaccesscontrols
and authenticationmechanismsat thehigher levelsof
the cloud architecture. The implementation of such
controlsandmechanisms isnon-trivial.
Problemssurrounding confidentiality, integrity and
availability can besolved in aphysical sense, but there
remains some interesting legal issues that need to be
solved beforemedical datacan besecurely stored on a
cloud-based service. These issues relate to the location
of cloud data (or, in fact, the transmission of any such
dataacrossnational boundaries) and theextent to which
the liability of a cloud provider is limited. Given that
Figure4: Largest SingleDenial of ServiceAttack [17, p5] .
a user of a cloud service does not know the physical
location of thedata, the law regarding who can access
thedataand inwhat circumstancesbecomesmurky. For
example, if dataare transferred vianetwork links inside
theUSA, thePatriot Act can be invokedwhich allows
USFederal authorities to capture thedata. Interestingly,
Amazon will not guarantee that its cloud servicewill
not transfer datavia theUSA.
Also, cloud providers such asGoogle and Amazon
havespecific no-liability clauses in their contracts. As
Calloway [18] pointsout, whilst limited liability clauses
are not new, their use in cloud service agreements is
problematic. Thevalueplaced onmedical datasuggests
that such contracts be examined carefully and the ex-
tent to which the cloud provider has reduced liability
fully articulated beforesuch servicesareemployed for
safety-critical data. This problem is reasonably well-
knownasSnooks[19, p4], with respect to theAustralian
Commonwealth Privacy Act notes that S¸Agencies en-
gaging cloud serviceprovidersneed to takeappropriate
contractual measures to ensurepersonal information is
protected, regardlessof whether or not theprovider (and
any subcontractors) arebased in Australiaor overseas.Tˇ.
Whilst theadvicegiven by Snooks iswell-founded, e.g.
contractually prohibiting a provider from transferring
data outside Australia, precisely how this obligation
would beor could beenforced isunclear.
Security is recognised asan issue for cloud comput-
ing. Lo et al. [20] for example, proposeacooperative
form of an intrusion detection system as a means of
detecting attacks (particularly DoS attacks) on cloud-
based systems. Simply, they place an intrusion detec-
tion system in each cloud and allow the systems to
transmit data about attacksbetween them, thusallow-
ing the other cloud(s) to have a priori knowledge of
a potential attack. Neisse et al. [21], in discussing
trust in cloud infrastructure, point out that encryption
isnot aperfect answer as, given that maliciousor neg-
ligent infrastructure providers have full control of the
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cloud infrastructure, they are able to give themselves
unrestricted access to the data. Neisse et al. provide
asystem, called BonaFides, which remotely monitors
and attests to the integrity of crucial system files, i.e.
it providesassuranceof claims, although it it doesnot
guaranteedata integrity. The former isaproblemwith
systemssuch asDropBox. DropBox doesencrypt data
as they areuploaded, which impliesa level of security;
however, thesystem issearchable, whichmeansthat the
infrastructure provider must have the keys to decrypt
thedata. This problem could, of course, be solved by
encrypting thedataprior to upload.
Aspointed out preciously, cloud servicesarenot just
about data storage (disk space) but can also include
CPU and bandwidth services. Thenatureof cloud com-
puting means that conventional security proceduresand
mechanismsmay not beappropriateor effective. Asan
exampleconsider thephysical decommissioning and de-
struction of hard diskscontaining sensitive information,
asmandated by several standards. ISO 27799, (2008,
p30) states that S¸In addition to following theguidance
given by ISO/IEC 27002, organizations [sic] processing
health information applicationsshall securely overwrite
or else destroy all media containing health informa-
tion application software or personal health informa-
tion when themedia are no longer required for use.Tˇ.
Thisprovessomewhat difficult to action when thedisks
are not owned by the client, but by an infrastructure
provider and impossiblewhen the disks on which the
dataarestoredarenot co-located, especially whenspace
on the same disksmay be allocated to another client,
who would, no doubt, beconcerned about thepotential
destruction of their data.
In summary, the difficulties in guaranteeing cloud
servicesecurity werediscussed and acasestudy which
highlighted someof theproblems likely to beencoun-
tered in thehosting of medical datawasexamined. Le-
gal issues to do with distributed hosting of dataor ser-
viceswerealso discussed.
5 Conclusion
This study explored the problems of using a nascent
technology, cloudcomputing, to storemedical data. The
complex nature of cloud services was revealed and a
casestudy that described the implementation of an iPad
app that transferred medical data was articulated and
discussed.
Specifically, thisstudy used acasestudy to show how
amedical data could be generated, stored and shared
using cloud computing. It was argued that cloud ser-
vicesprovided benefits in that thecloud façadehid the
complexity of data transfer and storage from the end-
user, ascompared to conventional databaseor file-based
storage techniques. It wasshown that thecloud could
inadvertently be responsible for security breachesunder
certain circumstances. In termsof the research question
posedearlier, thecasestudy providesevidencethat func-
tionality takesprecedenceover security requirements.
A limitation of thiswork is that it used only asingle
case study with a specific cloud platform, therefore it
would be unwise to conclude that all cloud platforms
or deployment models suffer from identical security
problems. Further work would involveextending this
idea to see how well other cloud providers dealt with
thesecurity issuesoutlined in thispaper. Other avenues
of research to be explored are DoS-resistant network
protocols (to address the problem of availability) and
homomorphic encryptionof databases(toaddressissues
of confidentiality and integrity). When these issuesare
solved, cloud computing will bean cost-effective and
efficient vehicle for the transport, storageand retrieval
of medical data.
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